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DISPARITY OUT OF UNIFORMITY:
RETHINKING THE CONTINUED VITALITY
OF THE CARMACK AMENDMENT'S PREEMPTION OF STATE CONSUMER

PROTECTION LAWS
Scott Davis*

I. INTRODUCTION

A

provision of federal law, dubbed the Carmack Amendment,
operates to severely limit the amount of liability that may be
assessed against interstate carriers, such as moving companies, when
consumer goods are lost or damaged in interstate shipment. The
Carmack Amendment does not distinguish between consumer
transactions, and its liability-limiting provisions have been applied to
consumers and businesses alike. This limitation acts to the near
universal exclusion of claims based upon state law, and has long been a
source of frustration for individual consumers who have attempted to
assert the protections against interstate carriers, including claims based
on consumer-friendly state statutes.
Over the past ioo years, courts have routinely held that the
Carmack amendment has pre-empted nearly all state law claims
against the liability of interstate carriers, including actions based on
state consumer protection law.1 This pre-emption has been applied
regardless of the degree of negligence, bad faith and in some cases
outright theft of goods alleged against an interstate moving company.2
However, the role of the common law in interpreting the Carmack
Amendment and assigning it a proper scope has largely been ignored.
This outcome creates problems for the individual consumer, and
undermine public confidence in the interstate moving industry in
.
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See infra Part III.
See, e.g., Hall v. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc., 476 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2007).
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general.
The courts have reasoned that the purpose underlying the
enactment of the Carmack Amendment is to create "uniformity out of
disparity '3, in order to relieve interstate carriers from the burden of
potentially facing differing and uncertain degrees of liability under the
laws of the various states in which they operate or traverse. However,
rather than strike a balance between the rights of interstate carriers and
those of individual consumers, any such advantage that has been
gained by the interstate carrier companies has come at the expense of
consumers' rights, and ultimately the end result benefits neither. For
the consumer, application of the Carmack Amendment creates a
confusing morass of disparity despite the uniformity of protections
promised by broadly worded state consumer protection laws. For the
moving industry, the lack of oversight or remedy to consumers has led
to a black eye from desultory reports in the media.4
Although one avenue for remedying the disparity suffered by
consumers at the hands of the Carmack Amendment is through
legislative reform,' such reform has been slow to come about.6 This
article proposes looking at another avenue to correct the disparity
between consumers and interstate carriers created by the Carmack
Amendment - re-evaluating the relationship between the Carmack preemption doctrine and the common law. Such a re-evaluation reveals
that the application of the Carmack pre-emption doctrine to consumer
protection claims by the Courts of Appeals lacks the doctrinal
foundation in Supreme Court decisions that is often taken for granted.
This article argues that the proper application of Carmack pre-emption
in light of the prior common law is to create an exception for state
consumer law claims. This interpretation provides consumer relief by
exempting state consumer law claims from the scope of the Carmack
Amendment, and thus allowing individual consumers to invoke the
protections they provide.
Contemporary courts have largely ignored the common law
when applying the doctrine of Carmack preemption. As a result, the
doctrine of Carmack preemption has been greatly over-extended the
past one hundred years into areas like consumer protection where
continued recognition no longer serves a pressing need of interstate
carriers and frustrates the purpose of consumer protection laws. More
Moffit v. Bekins Van Lines, 6 F. 3 d 305, 307 (5th Cir. 1993).

See, e.g., Dan Benson, Consumers Say Moving Companies are Taking them for a Ride,
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, May 6, 2002, available at http://www.jsonline.comlstoryl
index.aspx?id= 4 1222 (last visited November 4, 2oo8).
' See Joseph L. Franco, Needed, Private Attorneys General: Empowering Consumers to
Reform the Household Moving Industry, o LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 981 (2005), (proposing
legislation to create a federal private right of action for aggrieved consumers).
6 Id.atIoo-12.
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than a century later, the time has come to re-evaluate the position this
law holds in the domain of field preemption.
Much has changed in the years since the Carmack Amendment
was enacted. Since that time, developments in other related areas of the
law have eliminated the conditions the Carmack Amendment was
specifically designed to address.7 This article will trace the development
of the Carmack amendment, and the concerns that it was enacted to
address, as well explore the overextension in contemporary consumer
protection cases. This article will focus solely on the question of
Carmack pre-emption of state statutory consumer protection claims,
and does not encompass any issues regarding pre-emption of state
common law tort claims.8
Part II of this article will outline the Carmack Amendment
itself and its liability limiting provisions. Part III of this article will
explore the doctrine of field pre-emption generally and its application to
the Carmack Amendment specifically.
Part IV will highlight the
problems created by the Carmack Amendment in the context of
consumer protection claims and examine some recent and unsuccessful
attempts by plaintiffs to assert state consumer protection law claims
against interstate moving companies.9 Part V will then advance three
separate bases which provide avenues available to the courts to correct
this overextension and provide proper interpretation of the Carmack
pre-emption doctrine. The scope of this article will focus specifically on
the issue of Carmack pre-emption as applied to state Unfair or
Deceptive Acts and Practices ("UDAP") statutes. In doing so, the
article will consider the common law that developed prior to the
enactment of the Carmack amendment, the underlying purpose of the
Carmack amendment, and whether or not the Carmack amendment
continues to serve that purpose in light of advances in other areas of the
law. Finally, this article will address more recent congressional action,
which evidences intent to pull back- from the overextension that Courts
have given Carmack pre-emption.

7 See infra pp. 338-43.

' This article address consumer transactions under the Carmack Amendment, although
conceivably the same arguments set forth in this article would apply to business transactions, as
the pre- i9o6 common law did not distinguish between these types of transactions.
Although the term interstate carrier has a broader definition by statute, this article will
focus primarily on interstate moving companies due to their frequent involvement in Carmack
pre-emption and state consumer law cases.
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II. THE CARMACK AMENDMENT

A. HistoricalBackground - The Cloud of Uncertainty FacingInterstate
CarriersPriorTo The Carmack Amendment
The Carmack Amendment'l was originally enacted in 19o6 as
an amendment to the Interstate Commerce Commission Act of 1887."
Prior to its enactment in 19o6, it was the common practice of interstate
shipping companies to attempt to limit their liability on an individual
basis by a private contractual arrangement with their clients." This
practice originated in England, and had been practiced in the United
States from the very early days of the Republic. 3 This practice
attempted to limit the liability of a carrier for expensive items that
might be lost or damaged during the shipment, and served the needs of
the carriers, as common carriers often hauled goods of differing degrees
of value.
Under the common law, these liability-limiting contracts were
themselves subject to limitation by the Courts. Common carriers, for
example, generally could not exempt themselves from liability when
these limitations were unfair or unreasonable, 4 and under the eyes of
pre-Carmack jurisprudence, it was not just and reasonable that carriers
could limit their liability for their own negligence, or that of their
employees." Further, such agreements were not enforceable unless
they were entered into free of deception. 6
Prior to the enactment of the Carmack Amendment, there was
no controlling federal law on the books that spoke to the issue of
interstate carriers' potential liability for shipments in interstate
commerce. 7 Thus the federal courts looked to and applied state laws to
determine the liability of interstate carriers when items were lost or
damaged in shipment.' As a result, a carriers' attempt to limit its
prospective liability was often subject to differing principles of contract
interpretation under the laws of any one of a number of jurisdictions
through which a shipment might pass.
Just three years prior to the enactment of the Carmack
amendment, in 1903, the Supreme Court decided the case of
1049

U.S.C. § 147o6 (2005).

H Interstate Commerce Commission Act, 34 Stat. 584 (Igo6).
12 N.J. Steam Navigation Co. v. Merch. Bank of Boston, 47 U.S. 344, 367-68 (1848).
13

Id.

16

Hart v. Pa. R.R. Co.,

14 N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. 357 (1873).
IS Id.
112

U.S. 331, 340 (1884) (stating that contracts that are entered into

free of deceit would be upheld).
" Pa. R.R. Co. v. Hughes, I0I U.S. 477,489 (1903).
IS Id.
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PennsylvaniaRailroad Co. v. Hughes,19 which reaffirmed this point. In
Hughes, the defendant, an interstate carrier, sought to limit its liability
on an interstate shipment of a horse from New York to Pennsylvania
based upon a private contract. 20 The contract contained a provision
purporting to limit the liability of the interstate carrier and was
executed in New York, which it was argued, allowed for such a
contractual limitation of liability under state law. 21 However, the suit
was initiated in Pennsylvania, rather than New York, and the decision
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court being appealed in that case, held
that such a limitation on liability violated the public policy of
Pennsylvania and could not be enforced.22 The judgment of the
Pennsylvania court was affirmed because there was no controlling
federal statute upon which the defendant, or the Court, could rely upon
in order to overturn the decision of the Pennsylvania court.23
The Hughes case is probative of the purpose behind the
Carmack Amendment because its language highlights the patchwork of
state laws and differing liability schemes that interstate carriers were
facing at the time. The Court noted that in the federal courts, interstate
carries could generally enforce the contracts that limited their liability
on interstate shipments.24 While the case in some states, such as New
York, it is not so in others, such as Pennsylvania. 2' The Supreme Court
would, in a later decision, summarize the state of the then-existing law
by quoting a Georgia Appellate Court:
Some states allow carriers to exempt themselves from
all or a part of the common-law liability by rule,
regulation, or contract; others did not. The Federal
courts sitting in the various states were following the
local rule, a carrier being held liable in one court
when, under the same state of facts, he would be
exempt from liability in another. Hence this branch
of interstate commerce was being subjected to such a
diversity of legislative and judicial holding that it was
practically impossible for a shipper engaged in a
business that extended beyond the confines of his
own state, or a carrier whose lines were extensive, to
know, without considerable investigation and

112

11Id. at 477 (1903).
20 Id. at 478.
2" Id. at 484-85.
22 .Id. at 486.
23 Hughes, igi U.S. at 488.
24 Id. at 485 (specifically the court pointed to their decision in Hart v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co.,
U.S. 331 (1884); this decision pre-dates Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
21 Id. at 485-86.
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trouble, and even then oftentimes with but little
certainty, what would be the carrier's actual
responsibility as to goods delivered to it for
transportation from one state to another.26

Ultimately, the Hughes court affirmed the decision of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, but did not do so before practically
inviting Congress to make an addition to the existing body of federal
law in order to establish a uniform system of liability, and, in the
process, made a thinly veiled hint that such a law would pre-empt state
law concerning liability:
While under these provisions it may be said that
Congress has made it obligatory to provide proper
facilities for interstate carriage of freight, and has
prevented carriers from obstructing continuous
shipments on interstate lines, we look in vain for any
regulation of the matter here in controversy. There is no
sanction of agreements of this character limiting liability
to stipulated valuations, and, until Congress shall
legislate upon it, is there any valid objection to the state
enforcing its own regulationsupon the subject, although
it may to this extent indirectly affect interstate
commerce contracts of carriage?27
Presumably, this open invitation by the Court to enact what
would eventually become the Carmack Amendment, as well as the
surrounding historical circumstances, are strong evidence of the
underlying Congressional intent behind the Carmack Amendment,
perhaps the only positive evidence of Congressional intent available as
it was passed "without discussion or debate."2 . Thus, there is no
legislative history, long a favorite arena of both judges and legal
scholars on matters relating to legislative intent," to provide any insight
into Congress' intentions behind the Carmack Amendment or its scope.
Still, a number of courts have reasoned that the Carmack Amendment
was enacted to codify the common law regarding a shippers' ability to

26 Adams Express v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 505 (1913) (quoting

Southern P. Co. v.

Crenshaw Bros., 63 S.E. 865 (Ga. Ct. App. igog)).
27 Hughes, 191 U.S. at 488 (emphasis added).
s Rini v. United Van Lines, 104 F. 3 d 502, 504 (ist Cir. 1997).
29 E.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (in which the majority led by Justice
Brennan looked almost exclusively at the legislative history of Louisiana's Balanced Treatment for
Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in Public School Instruction Act, in holding that the Act
was not passed for any valid secular purpose).
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limit its liability." It was in this historical context, and within three
years of the Hughes decision, that the Carmack Amendment was
enacted in 19o6.
B. Rights and Protections Grantedto Interstate Carriers Under the
Carmack Amendment
The Carmack Amendment provides a scheme defining the
liability of interstate carriers under federal law. 1 Most notable are the
liability-limiting provisions of the Carmack amendment for interstate
carriers.32 These provisions provide for an absolute maximum limit on
the liability of interstate carriers to the replacement value of any goods
that are lost or damaged in interstate shipments. 3 Although this
purports to set a maximum value on the liability that can be assessed to
interstate shippers, the Carmack amendment also provides for a type of
liquidated damages mechanism to further insulate the shippers from
full liability. The Carmack Amendment allows for the shippers to
obtain a waiver from the consumer which caps the liability of an
interstate carrier at a fixed price.34 The Carmack Amendment and the
rate schedules it proscribes were enforced by the Interstate Commerce
Commission ("ICC") from 19o6 until 1995, at which time the ICC was
abolished, with most of the functions being assigned now to the Surface
The Surface Transportation Board now
Transportation Board.
36
determines the fixed rate provided under the Carmack Amendment.
Currently, the rates set by the Surface Transportation Board
under this provision are for a recovery of 6o¢ per pound of goods.3
Thus, by way of an example, a consumer who engages an interstate
carrier to move across the country with a typical 5,000 pounds of
household goods, would be limited to a maximum recovery of $3,000.00
30 See, e.g., Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Elmore & Stahl, 377 U.S. 134, 137-38 (1964); World
Wide Moving and Storage Inc., v. Dist. of Columbia, 445 F.3d 422 (D.C. Cir. 2o06).
31 49 U.S.C. § 14706 (2005). A general definition of an interstate carrier can be found in 49
U.S.C §13102(3) (2008).
32 49 U.S.C. § 147o6(f).
33 49 U.S.C. § 147o6(a). Interstate moving companies are freight forwarders as defined in 49
U.S.C. § 13102(8).
34 49 U.S.C. § 147o6(f)(3).
"s ICC Termination Act, Pub. L. No. 104-88, lO9 Stat. 803 (1995).
36 49 U.S.C § 147o6(f)(I).
37 The Surface Transportation Board set this rate in 2001 in a decision which also allows that
interstate carriers charge consumers a higher price for "additional coverage" in order to adequately
insure the value of their household goods in 2001. Released Rates of Motor Common Carriers of
Household Goods, 5 S.T.B. 1147 (2OO). As an alternative, the Board also allows for a flat
declaration per pound for the value of goods without the additional protection option. That value
was previously based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics U.S. City Average Index. On July 26, 2006
the Surface Transportation Board announced that the Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price
Index-All Urban Consumers, would be adopted as the index upon which these prices will now be
based, available at http://www.stb.dot.gov/decisions/readingroom.nsf/unid/ceb20588faleObOa8525
7 lb70046df6e/$file/37121 .pdf.
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under the Carmack Amendment if their possessions were lost, stolen or
damaged. This is regardless of the degree of negligence or willful
misconduct of the shipper.38
III. THE CARMACK AMENDMENT AND PREEMPTION
A. "In determining the scope of Carmack preemption, we look to the
intent of Congress and the purpose of the Amendment."39
True to form, when the newly enacted Carmack amendment
came before the Supreme Court for the first time since the Hughes
decision on a question of pre-emption, the Supreme Court held that the
Carmack amendment pre-empted state law claims which affected the
liability of interstate carriers.
B. The Adams Express Case and Field Preemption
Almost without exception, modern cases that pre-empt state
consumer protection law claims under the Carmack amendment trace
their analysis back to one case4" - Adams Express v. Croninger1 .
The plaintiff in Adams Express sought to recover the value of a
diamond ring that had been lost during a shipment by an interstate
express company." The defendant, sought to limit its liability under its
rate schedules and under the newly enacted Carmack Amendment.4 3
After the plaintiff had obtained a judgment for the full value of the ring
in state court based upon state law, the company sought review before
the Supreme Court arguing that the recovery should be limited and
reduced to an amount fixed according to the schedules authorized by
the Carmack amendment." In deciding Adams Express, Justice Horace
Lurton, writing for a unanimous Court, noted that the question before
the court was whether or not state law, in this case Kentucky law, or
federal law governed the recovery amount for the diamond ring.45
Before announcing the final decision, the Court in Adams
Express dutifully noted the prior case law, which would seem to hold
that state law claims against interstate express carriers were
s See, e.g., Se. Express Co. v. Pastime Amusement Co., 299 U.S. 28 (1936) (Plaintiff's claim
of negligence against an interstate carrier for failure to deliver a film on time is preempted by the
Carmack Amendment).
19Rini, 104 F. 3 d at 504.
40 Moffit, 6 F. 3 d. at 3o6; Hall v. N. Am. Van Lines, 476 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2007).
41 Adams Express, 226 U.S. at491.
42 Id. at 492. The case itself however is silent as to just how such a loss occurred, merely that
the shipment was never delivered.
13 Id. at 493.
44

Id.

" Id. at 499-500.
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permissible, including the aforementioned Pennsylvania Railroad v.
Hughes,46 however the Court then specifically looked at the more recent
congressional actions in enacting the Carmack Amendment. This
indicated, in the view of the court, an intention to overturn those prior
decisions and pre-empt state law claims on the issue."
Ultimately in Adams Express, the court held that the Carmack
amendment pre-empted the Kentucky state law by invoking the littleused doctrine of field pre-emption.4 8 A revealing passage of the Adams
Express decision shows just why the Court found in favor of field preemption:
To hold that the liability therein declared may be
increased or diminished by local regulation or local views
of public policy will either make the provision less than
supreme, or indicate that Congress has not shown a
purpose to take possession of the subject. The first would
be unthinkable, and the latter would be to revert to the
uncertainties and diversities of rulings which led to the
amendment.4 9
The underlying rationale for finding that the Carmack
amendment pre-empted state law was the differing and, in the court's
own words, confusing provisions of state law facing interstate carriers
at the time."° An interstate carrier may face completely different
liabilities in a Pennsylvania court, as opposed to a New York court, or
in a federal court in either state. Because of this uncertainty, the
Carmack amendment was necessary in 19o6.
Even so, the language of the Adams Express decision indicates
that the prior common law was to be adopted into the freshly created
doctrine of Carmack pre-emption. Speaking as to the relationship
between state and federal laws, the Court mentioned that pre-existing
federal law should be applied so as to give the amendment proper
interpretation:
To construe this proviso as preserving to the holder of
any such bill of lading any right or remedy which he
may have had under existing Federal law at the time of
his action gives to it a more rational interpretation than
one which would preserve rights and remedies under
46 Id.
"
48

at 504-06.

Adams Express, 226 U.S. at 505-o6.

Id.

41 Id. at 506.
50 Id.
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existing state laws, for the latter view would cause the
proviso to destroy the act itself."
The early decisions under the Carmack Amendment would
continue to look to the common law for guidance.
C. Justice Lurton and the Advent of the Carmack Pre-emptionDoctrine
The Adams Express decision was issued on January 6, i913,"2

but was only the first in a series of three decisions under the Carmack
Amendment that were handed down that same day. All three opinions
were authored and delivered by Justice Lurton. While, the case of
3 was
Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis and Omaha Railway Co. v. Latta,"
perfunctorily decided based upon the basis of the Adams Express
decision and offers little insight into the development of the Carmack
Amendment, the third decision of the day in Chicago Burlington and
Quincy Railway Company v. Miller,4 does include some insightful
language.
In Chicago Burlington, the Court applied the Adams Express
decision and held the Carmack Amendment had "superseded all state
regulations on the same subject.""5 The Court specifically confined its
remarks on Carmack pre-emption to state "regulations" and was
notably silent as to whether or not the common law that had previously
been applied by the federal courts had also been superseded. 6
Although Chicago Burlington only hints that the common-law was
retained after the passage of the Carmack Amendment, subsequent
decisions, including the next Carmack Amendment case decided by the
court would confirm that indeed it was.
The next Carmack Amendment decision from the Supreme
Court was handed down a mere two months after Adams Express Kansas City Southern Railway Co. v. Carl." In this opinion, the Court
addressed the question of Carmack pre-emption and the common law
that existed prior to 19o6. Justice Lurton again wrote for the majority. 8
In this case, the plaintiff claimed that the shipping agreement in
question sought to limit a carrier's liability for its own negligence and
that such an exemption was actually forbidden by the Carmack

53
54

I' at 5o8-o9.
Id.
IId. at 491.
226 U.S. 519 (1913).
226

U.S. 513 (1913)"

s" Id. atsI18.
56 Id.
57 227 U.S. 639 (1913).
" Id. There were two dissenting votes to this opinion.
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Amendment. 9 The Court recognized that this case was governed by
the Carmack Amendment," however, in deciding this question, the
Court specifically looked beyond the text of the Amendment to the
principles of the common law and applied them to the facts of the case.
Specifically the Court, quoting from its earlier decision in Adams
Express, stated that "a statutory declaration that a contract of
exemption from liability for negligence is against public policy and
void."
Under this common law principle, the Court reasoned that
even under the Carmack amendment, exemptions from liability for
negligence were forbidden.6 2
Ultimately, the Court held that the agreement and the Carmack
Amendment did not exempt the carrier from liability, but did hold that
the value of the lost goods could be established by the rates and
declaration of value signed by the consumer.63 For purposes of this
article, and any discussion of the relationship between the Carmack
Amendment and consumer protection claims, it is worth noting that the
Court specifically stated before delivering the opinion, that "There was
no evidence tending to show any misrepresentation made by the
company, or of any deceit, or fraud, or concealment.614 The logical
inference being that this was a sort of pre-requisite to the issue of
Carmack pre-emption and had there been such conduct, the liabilitylimiting principles of the Carmack amendment would not apply.
However, the important principle to glean from the Carl case is that the
weight and precedence given by the Court to the pre-Carmack common
law.
These first Carmack cases, all of which were authored by
Justice Lurton, demonstrated a commitment to interpret the Carmack
amendment in harmony with prior common law rules. Specifically, in
both the Adams Express and Carl cases, the Court addressed the
concern of fairness and deception, and implicit in its reasoning can be
found the standard that an attempt to limit a carriers liability under the
Carmack amendment would be invalid if it were unfair or entered into
via deception.
D. Subsequent Development of the Carmack preemption Doctrine
The over-extension of the doctrine of Carmack preemption
Ild. at 649. Although the Court stated that it was forbidden by the Carmack amendment, it
is probably more accurate to say it was forbidden by principles of common law, having been
retained after the passage of the Carmack amendment.
o Id. at 648-49.
61 Id.
61 Id. at 650.
' Kansas CityRy. Co., 227 U.S. at 655-56.
6

Id. at 642.
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began in earnest in 1914 with the High Court's decision in Boston &
Maine Railroad Co v. Hooker.65 In this decision, authored by Justice
William R. Day, the Court looked to the Carmack Amendment to limit
the liability of a railway company for its negligence in losing a
passenger's baggage, despite the fact that the railroad had simply
posted its rate schedules in the train station and not provided the
plaintiff with actual notice of the rates.66 In doing so; the majority was
dismissive of the application of the common law to the Carmack
67
amendment.
This decision brought a scathing dissent from Justice Mahlon
Pitney.68 Justice Pitney cited to Adams Express as authority for his
argument that the common law continued to apply in conjunction with
the Carmack amendment and argued that accordingly the common law
surrounding interstate shippers should still govern. 69 He pointed out
that there was "nothing in the letter or the policy of the acts that
absolved a carrier from its long-recognized duty to treat shippers and
passengers fairly."7
Justice Pitney also forewarned that such
consequences would prove to be disastrous for an average consumer. 7
The Hooker Court's dismissive treatment of the common-law
was an aberration in early Carmack Amendment decisions. In later
years, the Court gradually drifted away from the practice of looking to
the pre-Carmack common law and analyzing Carmack pre-emption in
light of these common law principles, however, on occasion, after
Hooker, the Court did reinforce the validity of the pre-Carmack
common law.72
. Following Hooker, Justice Pitney was chosen to deliver the next
opinion issued by the Court involving the Carmack Amendment. In a
decision that seems highly relevant to a contemporary state consumer
protection claim, the Court in Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railway Co.
73
of Texas v. Harris,
upheld an award of attorneys' fees to a plaintiff
who had successfully brought a cause of action under the Carmack
Amendment, over the arguments of a shipper that such an award be
pre-empted by the Amendment. The plaintiff's recovery of his
attorneys' fees was made under a separate provision of Texas state
law. 4 In so holding, the Court noted that such an award of attorneys'
65 233 U.S. 97 (914).

66 Id. at 121.
67 Id. at 12o-2i.

6 Id. at 122-57.
69 Id. at 137-38.
7' Boston and Maine Ry. Co., 233 U.S. at 155.
7'Id. at 156-57.
71 See, e.g., Chicago Nw. Ry. Co. v. C.C. Witnack Produce Co., 258 U.S. 369 (1922).
73 234 U.S. 412 (1914).

74 Id. at4I1
5.
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fees under state law was not inconsistent with the Carmack
Amendment and was not pre-empted by the Amendment."5
Inexplicably, the Harris case seems to be almost forgotten in modern
jurisprudence.
Contemporary consumer protection cases that fall
under the Carmack Amendment have not looked to Harris for
guidance, despite its. obvious implication that a state law recovery of
attorneys' fees can be had under the Carmack Amendment.76
Since 1964, the Supreme Court has not heard any cases arising
under the Carmack amendment." Thus it has fallen to the Courts of
Appeals to apply the Adams Express decision and its progeny to
modern consumer protection cases.7" These courts have found
justification for pre-emption of state consumer protection laws under
the umbrella of "field preemption."79 In doing so, the courts have
generally considered the broad language of the Carmack Amendment
itself as the basis for continuing to find that it pre-empts state consumer
protection laws."° The courts generally have not revisited or questioned
the enduring vitality of the Carmack pre-emption doctrine nor have
they been inclined to revisit the issue of the common law, or the insight
it provides into the question of preempting state consumer protection
laws.
The result has been a gradual judicial drift away from the preCarmack common law, and the early decisions regarding Carmack preemption. Because this judicial drift has come at the expense of the preexisting common law, which was retained by the Supreme Court in its
early Carmack decisions, the foundation supporting the ektension of
Carmack preemption to state consumer protection laws is suspect and
the issue is ripe for re-consideration.
IV. THE NEED To REVISIT THE ISSUE OF CARMACK PREEMPTION

The Carmack Amendment is outdated because the problems it
sought to correct have been obviated by subsequent developments in
the law. However, continued application of the Amendment and its
pre-emption doctrine in its current form has left a trail of inequitable
results for consumers and leaves the interstate shipping industry largely
unregulated. These current problems coupled with the unsupported
71 Id.

at 420-21.

76 The Tenth Circuit did look to this case in its decision in A.T. Clayton Co. v. Missouri Tex.

and Kan. Ry. Co., 9oi F.2d 833 (ioth Cir. 199o), however even this case has not been widely
adopted.
77 See Missouri Pac.Ry. Co., 377 U.S. at 134.
71 The Supreme Court has never addressed the question of whether or not state consumer
protection actions are preempted by the Carmack Amendment.
7' Roberts v. N. Am. Van Lines, 394 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1182-84 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
o Id.
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extension of the Carmack preemption doctrine mandate a re-evaluation
of the proper scope of the Carmack Amendment.
A. The Carmack Amendment No Longer Serves the Purposes For Which
It Was Enacted
The Carmack Amendment presents the somewhat unique
prospect that Congressional intent cannot be discerned in any way from
the amendment's legislative history, as the Carmack Amendment has
no legislative history."
Congressional intent, in this case, is best
derived from the environment in which the statute was born.
Modern courts have consistently preempted state consumer
protection claims under the Carmack Amendment on the basis that
allowing such claims would cause a reversion back to the "morass" of
confusion and uncertain liability that existed before the enactment of
the Carmack Amendment. 83 However, this assertion is based more on
rote repetition of an unquestioned doctrine rather than upon an actual
analysis of modern or common law. 4 This conclusion is also erroneous
as to the conditions which created the "morass" that existed have long
since been displaced by subsequent developments in the law.
The rationale adopted in Adams Express for finding in favor of
field preemption rested on two key points: i)that interstate carriers
faced potentially differing degrees of liability in federal as opposed to
state courts8 5 and 2) that interstate carriers were unable to effectively
ascertain which state law would apply to the shipment.8" Although
these may have been legitimate concerns a century ago, today both of
these concerns have now largely disappeared through entirely separate
developments in the law.
B. Advent of the Erie Doctrine
The first concern raised in Adams Express was that interstate
carriers faced the possibility of facing differing schemes of liability in
federal courts as opposed to state courts.87 At the time that Carmack
Amendment was enacted in 19o6, the controlling rule for federal courts
8' Rini, l04 F. 3 d at 504.
52

See United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 432 (1943) (Frankfurter J. dissenting) (stating

that "a statute, like other living organisms, derives significance and sustenance from its
environment, from which it cannot be severed without being mutilated").
Moffit, 6 F. 3 d at 307.
Not since the Adams Express decision, and certainly not since the development of the Erie
doctrine, has a court really engaged in any sort of meaningful analysis of the uncertainties that
interstate carriers might face in a modern world.
s Adams Express, 226 U.S. at 504-05.
Id.
87 Id.
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hearing a state law claim was the rule of Swift v. Tyson,8" which held
that a federal court sitting in diversity was free to exercise its
independent judgment to determine what the law should be.89 Thus, a
defendant in federal court could potentially face different liability than
he faced in a state court if a federal judge felt that some different body
of law ought to apply." It was under this highly unpredictable rule of
law that the Carmack Amendment was enacted and Adams Express
was decided. Twenty-five years later, in 1938, this concern was
effectively resolved by another case that involved an interstate carrier Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins.9
In Erie, a defendant railroad company faced an uncertain
amount of liability for a personal injury that occurred in interstate
transit.92 In Erie, we see an echo of the same concerns of uncertainty
that pre-dated the Carmack Amendment. The Erie court effectively
eliminated this uncertainty though by overruling the unpredictable rule
of Swift v. Tyson and holding that federal courts sitting in diversity
were now bound to apply the law of state in which the federal court
sat.93 With the Erie decision, interstate carriers were no longer faced
with the prospect of differing liabilities in state versus federal court.
Federal courts, now applying state law, should assess the same rules of
liability that a state court would.
The Erie decision effectively eliminated the federal/state
confusion question upon which the need for the Carmack Amendment
was partially predicated. State law should now be applied equally in
both federal and state courts.
However, even after Erie specifically addressed one of twin
pillars of concern supporting the Carmack Amendment, federal courts
still did not question the continuing wisdom of the Carmack preemption doctrine.
C. Choice of Law and Forum Selection After Carnival Cruise Lines
Even after Erie, an interstate carrier could still face differing
liabilities in any given state that obtained jurisdiction over the
shipment. 4 This was precisely the situation in Hughes, in which a
88 41 U.S. 1 (1842).

19 Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71 (1938).
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 It is interesting to note that had Erie concerned an injury to property, rather than a
personal injury, it would have fallen under the scope of the Carmack Amendment and would not
have provided us with the monumental Erie doctrine that is so familiar throughout the legal
community.
9' Erie, 304 U.S. at 71.

94This could be especially problematic in cases concerning torts as the prior Conflict of Law
rule of lex loci delicti required that the law of the state where the injury was suffered controlled
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Pennsylvania court refused to apply New York law to a contract which
was entered into in New York. 5 Thus, the interstate carriers still
lacked a way to adequately ensure some sort of certainty as to what
their liabilities would be and still depended on the Carmack
amendment to provide that certainty. This concern arguably remained
a legitimate one until i99I, when the Supreme Court's decision in
Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute96 was issued."
In Carnival Cruise Lines, the Court upheld a forum selection
and choice of law claim that had been included as standard boilerplate
language in a contract for a cruise on the high seas.98 In conducting its
analysis, the Court noted that forum selection clauses are
presumptively valid. 9 The Court went on to specifically enumerate
three reasons why the forum selection clause in the cruise contract was
valid. All three reasons are also universally applicable to interstate
carriers. 100
First, the court stated:
"[A] cruise line has a special interest in limiting the fora
in which it potentially could be subject to suit. Because
a cruise ship typically carries passengers from many
locales, it is not unlikely that a mishap on a cruise could
subject the cruise line to litigation in several different
fora.")ioi
The same rationale is directly applicable to interstate carriers,
who, by the very nature of their enterprise conduct business and travel
through many locales. The court noted that the transitory nature of the
cruise line gave it a "special interest" in limiting the fora in which it
potentially faced a lawsuit. By extension then, interstate carriers which
also traverse many locales in the course of interstate commerce should
likewise possess this same special interest.
liability. Thus, an interstate carrier shipping from California to New York for example could
potentially face liability under the laws of any of the states through which it passed en route to its
destination. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 379 (1934) (defendant's liability
determined by "the law of the place of wrong"); id. at § 377, note i (the place of wrong for torts
involving bodily harm is "the place where the harmfulforce takes effect upon the body" (emphasis
in original)).
's PennsylvaniaR.R. Co., ioi U.S. at 477.
96 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
"7 The Supreme Court first applied a presumption of validity to choice of forum clauses in
The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972), but Carnival Cruise Lines is particularly
important as it relates to this article for both its rationale and the fact that it dealt with consumer
transactions rather than business transactions.
9 Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 587.
Id. at 589.

o Carnival Cruise Lines involved a case arising under the admiralty jurisdiction of the
federal courts, an exclusively federal domain, as is the domain of interstate commerce; id.
o' Id. at 593.
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Next, the court stated:
Additionally, a clause establishing ex ante the forum for
dispute resolution has the salutary effect of dispelling
any confusion about where suits arising from the
contract must be brought and defended, sparing
litigants the time and expense of pretrial motions to
determine the correct forum and conserving judicial
resources that otherwise would be devoted to deciding
those motions.' °2

This reason is equally applicable to interstate carriers as it is to
cruise lines because interstate carriers do similarly face potential
litigation in a variety of different forums.
The third reason advanced by the Court was that: "it stands to
reason that passengers who purchase tickets containing a forum clause
like that at issue in this case benefit in the form of reduced fares
reflecting the savings that the cruise line enjoys by limiting the fora in
which it may be sued."'0 3 This line of reasoning also is equally
applicable to interstate carriers. We have seen that prior to 19o6,
interstate carriers had a real concern about their potential liability. By
extending the same forum selection benefit to interstate carriers that
was granted to cruise lines, it stands to reason that enjoyment of
reduced rates would follow."°
Under the reasoning and rationale in Carnival Cruise Lines,
and by application to the field of interstate shipping,"' an interstate
carrier should now perfectly capable of reviving the ancient practice of
forging private contracts with consumers and eliminating any
confusion or uncertainty about potential liability in any disputes with
the consumer. Carriers would be perfectly capable of establishing,
before undertaking any shipments, which state's law may govern the
shipment and even the appropriate forum to bring the suit
With the adoption of the Erie Doctrine and the Carnival Cruise
Lines decision, the morass of uncertain liability that swirled around
interstate carries prior to the Carmack Amendment has ceased to exist
and the rationale for federal preemption of state law has now
disappeared. If the Carmack Amendment were simply deleted from the
102 Id. at 593-94.
103 Id.
'o

See Franco,supra note 5,at 985.

This would not be the first time that admiralty law would have set the pattern for land
based shipping companies to follow. See Hart v. Pa.R.R. Co., 112 U.S. 33I (1884) in which the
Court looked to the admiralty case of New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Merch. Bank of
Boston, 47 U.S. 344 (1848) for validation of the principle that a land based common carrier could
contractually limit their liability.
105
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U.S. Code tomorrow, interstate carriers should still have sufficient
resources under the law to be able to limit any uncertainty as to the
legal liability they might face.
The two twin pillars of concern that supported the Carmack
amendment from the beginning are no longer viable, yet no proverbial
Samson has yet come forward to directly challenge the vitality of
Carmack pre-emption.
D. Frustrationsof Individual Consumers Under the Carmack
Amendment
The body of consumer protection law is a relatively new
development, being essentially nonexistent before the 2 0 th Century.0 6
In that time, the most significant consumer protection law is the
Wheeler-Lea Amendment to the Federal Trade Commission Act, °7
which outlawed unfair and deceptive acts in interstate commerce in
order to grant consumer protection. powers to the Federal Trade
Commission ("F.T.C.") and upon which a myriad of state consumer
protection laws are based. Prior to that time the F.T.C. 's jurisdiction
had been limited to the regulation and enforcement of anti-trust
08
matters. 1
By their very nature, consumer protection laws are designed to
protect individual consumers against unfair and deceptive acts and
practices by sophisticated businesses."9 Federal law provides for a
blanket prohibition on unfair or deceptive acts or practices against
consumers that occur in interstate commerce," 0 and.a network of state
laws, often termed UDAP laws, patterned after federal consumer
protection laws,"' grant individual causes of action to consumers
injured by unfair or deceptive acts or practices." 2
These state law UDAP claims often provide superior relief than
allowed under the Carmack Amendment" 3 and consumers have sought
to hold interstate' carriers liable for damages under such acts.
Universally, these cases against interstate carriers have fallen prey to
106 At common law, the only action which could remotely be styled a consumer protection

matter was common law fraud. Today fraud is often alleged concurrently with consumer
protection claims but is largely considered as a distinct action sounding in tort.
107 Wheeler-Lea Amendment, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2o6).
'o
See Marc Winerman, The Origins of the FTC: Concentration,Cooperation, Control and
Competition, 71 ANTITRUST L. J. 1 (2003) (In its infancy, the Federal Trade Commission's role
was confined to enforcing antitrust matters primarily under the Sherman Antitrust Act.
109 See, e.g., Lyne v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 772 F. Supp. io64, io68-69 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
110 5 U.S.C. § 41. This chapter is known as the Federal Trade Commission Act. The

Federal Trade Commission does not have jurisdiction of all businesses, there are specific
industries, such as banks and interstate carriers which are exempt from FTC enforcement.
...E.g., WASH. REV. CODE § i9.86.020 (2008).
112 Id.
113 E.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1780 (2009).
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the Carmack pre-emption doctrine, with the interstate carriers invoking
the liability-limiting protections of the Carmack Amendment. To date,
consumers have largely been unsuccessful in escaping from the grasps
of Carmack preemption, despite raising allegations of manifestly unfair
and deceptive acts on the part of intestate carriers."'
E. A False Start - Attempting to Narrow the Scope of Carmack
Preemption
In another largely forgotten case, Boston & M.R.R.R. v.
Piper,"5 the Supreme Court held that a carrier's attempts to limit the
liability of interstate carriers for negligence in delays of delivery fell
outside the scope of the Carmack amendment and were void." 6
Although, Piper has not routinely been discussed by the lower courts,
for a brief period, a movement arose which allowed consumers' state
UDAP claims to survive the Carmack amendment by narrowing the
scope of Carmack preemption. This movement began in earnest when
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the Carmack
Amendment did not pre-empt state common law rules governing
computation of damages for a lost shipment."7
In 1988, this argument seemed to gain momentum when it Was
adopted by the District of Massachusetts in a pair of cases under the
Carmack Amendment that permitted consumers to assert state
consumer protection claims against interstate carriers."' In the first
case to come before the court, Sokhos v. Mayflower Transit,"9 the
plaintiff asserted, among other claims, a claim under Massachusetts'
UDAP statute against Mayflower Transit, an interstate moving
company.' ° The plaintiff alleged unfair and deceptive acts in the
process of making the inventory of the goods that were shipped. 2' The
moving company, it was alleged, did not show the inventory list to the
plaintiff until after the moving truck had been loaded. 2 The plaintiff
claimed that the method of conducting the inventory prevented her
from ensuring that the inventory list was accurate, violating
... Clark v. Zimmerman, 394 F. Supp. 1x66 (M.D. Pa. i075).
IS Boston & M.R.R.R. v. Piper, 246 U.S. 439 (i918).
1I6 d. at 445.
"'
Reed v. Aaacon Auto Transport, 637 F.2d 1302 (ioth Cir. ig8i). Unfortunately this
exception to Carmack pre-emption was short lived in the Tenth Circuit. Eight years later the
Tenth Circuit overruled the Reed decision in Underwriters of Loyd's of London v. N. Am. Van
Lines, 890 F.2d 1112 (ioth Cir. 1989).
'
See Sokhos v. Mayflower Transit Inc., 691 F. Supp. 1578 (D. Mass.i988); and Mesta v.
Allied Van Lines, 695 F. Supp. 63 (D. Mass.1988).
"' Id. at 1578. The question came before the court on a motion for summary judgment by
the Defendant.
10 Id. at 1579.
121 Id. at 1581-82.
.. Id. at 1579.
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Massachusetts' UDAP law.' 23 The court allowed the UDAP claim to go
forward on the basis that this practice was unrelated to the loss or
damage that occurred while in shipment and was thus outside the scope
of Carmack pre-emption.' 24
In the second case, Mesta v. Allied Van Lines, 2 an individual
consumer hired the Defendant to ship household goods from a port of
entry to her home." 6 The Plaintiff, after the goods were lost while in
shipment, filed a claim with the defendant shipping company, who
failed to respond to the claim for nine months.'2 7 The District Court,
while holding that the Carmack Amendment pre-empted other state
law. claims, held that the Carmack Amendment did not pre-empt a
claim based on the Massachusetts UDAP statute for the Defendant's
conduct in failing to respond to the damage claims submitted by the
Plaintiff.' The basis for this decision was that the Defendant's conduct
occurred entirely after the shipment was made and was not undertaken
in the course of transporting goods, ergo Carmack pre-emption did not
apply. 129

The doctrine that began to emerge from these cases was that
Carmack preemption was limited to losses and damages incurred
during the actual shipment of goods, yet related actions, such as
negotiating an agreement or loading a moving truck, were still subject
to state consumer protection laws.
However, this development, which favored consumers, was
short lived. Just seven years later, after the District Court of
Massachusetts had again allowed a consumer to assert the state UDAP
statute in a claim against an interstate mover, 3 ° the First Circuit
reversed the decision.'
In an attempt to clarify the state of the law
regarding Carmack preemption, the Court held that:
In light of the Court's holding in Varnville'32 , we find that all
state laws that impose liability on carriers based on the loss or damage
of shipped goods are preempted. A state law "enlarges the responsibility
of the carrier for loss or at all affects the ground of recovery, or the
measure of recovery," where, in the absence of an injury separate and
123

Id.

124 Sokhos, 691 F. Supp. at
125 Mesta, 695 F. Supp. 63.
126

1582.

Id. at 63-64.

127 Id.
12 Id. at 65.
129 Id.
Iso

See Rini v. United Van Lines, 903 F. Supp. 224 (D. Mass. 1995).

131 Rini v. United Van Lines, IO4 F. 3 d 502 (1st Cir. 1997).

152 The Varnville case referenced in this quotation is Charleston & Western CarolinaRy. Co.
v. Varnville FurnitureCo., 237 U.S. 597 0915), which preempted a South Carolina state law that
required interstate carriers to reimburse consumers for lost or damaged goods within 40 days of
the loss.
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apart from the loss or damage of goods, it increases the liability of the
carrier. Preempted state law claims, therefore, include all liability
stemming from damage or loss of goods, liability stemming from the
claims process, and liability related to the payment of claims.'33
In making this ruling, the court recognized and overruled the
Sokhos and Mesta cases, effectively putting an end to all state claims,
including UDAP claims, against interstate movers.'3 4
F. Roberts v. North American Van Lines as a ContemporaryArchetype
In 2004, in one of the more recent cases illustrative of the
modern state of the Carmack preemption doctrine in the consumer
protection field, a group of plaintiffs filed a class action in the Northern
District of California against the interstate moving company North
American Van Lines. 3 5 The plaintiffs in that case alleged "widespread
and deceptive practices of baiting consumers with reasonable written
estimates," and then artificially inflating the cost and withholding
delivery of the consumers' possessions unless the higher amount was
paid. 136
The named plaintiffs alleged in their complaint a series of
unconscionable acts by the defendant. The first plaintiff alleged that
when she hired North American Van Lines to move her daughter's
possessions across the county she was quoted an estimated price of
$3,028.50 based on an estimate that the goods weighed 3,500 pounds.'3 7
That charge more than doubled to $6,172.53 just after North American
had taken possession of her goods and loaded them on the moving
truck. 3 ' North American then refused to return her household goods
until she paid the full amount.139 When she protested the higher charge,
she was threatened with incurring additional costs for storage fees,
according to the complaint. 4 0
The other class representative alleged that she was also
provided an acceptable estimate, but that in the end, the move would
cost actually cost triple the estimated price, because the Defendant has

133 Rini, 104 F. 3 d at 506.
134 Id. at 5o6 n. 3. A similar fate befell consumers in the Tenth Circuit which had previously

allowed for state law claim5 for punitive damages against an interstate carrier in Reed v. Aaco
Moving, but which was later reversed.
'3'

Roberts v. N. Am. Van Lines, 394 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (N.D.Cal. 2004).

1 Id. at II75.

137 Id. at I176.
13' Id. The actual weight claimed by North American Van Lines was actually 8,18o pounds,
a difference of 4.68o pounds from the estimate; a remarkable difference for an experienced moving
company.

139 Id.
140

Id.
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misestimated the weight of her possessions by more than 50 percent. 4 1
This plaintiff heard of the increase in price before the moving truck
was loaded and she instructed the movers to not load anything as she
was going to hire another moving company.'42 In her absence, the
North American Van Lines movers loaded up all of her possessions
anyways, and moved them across the country from California to
Massachusetts.'43 After the plaintiff finally located her possessions, she
was told that the actual moving weight was 8,ooo pounds.'44 A week
later, she was informed that the moving weight increased again, this
time to 9,120 pounds and the cost of the move accordingly increased as
well.'45 She refused to pay and North American threatened to auction
off her belongings and began charging her storage fees.'4 6 With the
extra fees she was charged, her total cost nearly tripled from the
already-inflated cost of the move.47
The plaintiffs asserted among their causes of action a violation
of California's Consumers Legal Remedy Act. 4
California law
provides for a significant plaintiff's recovery when the Consumers
Legal Remedy Act is violated, including: actual damages, restitution of
property and attorney's fees and costs in addition to punitive
damages.'49 The defendant, North American Van Lines, sought to
dismiss all state law claims on the basis of Carmack pre-emption."' In
the court's analysis of the Carmack pre-emption issue, the court
specifically looked to Adams Express v. Croniger"' and subsequent
decisions from the court of appeals as binding precedent which cast a
rather wide net of pre-emption on all of the plaintiff's state law
claims.'52 The court did not consider, nor was the issue apparently
raised, the effect of the common law on these state law claims.
Rather than challenge the enduring validity of Adams Express
in light of the common law, the Plaintiffs claimed that the operative
facts giving rise to the consumer protection claims placed their claims
outside of the actual interstate shipment of the goods and was therefore

Roberts, 394 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. In Ms. Saks-Young's case the price was curiously
increased even before any items were loaded onto the moving truck.
142
143
144

Id.
Id.
Id.

141 Id.
Ms. Saks-Young alleged that she had asked to have her belongings re-weighed in her
presence and that North American Van Lines did this re-weighing without her.
146 Id.
14' Roberts, 394 F. Supp. 2d at I17 7.

141
149

ISO

Id. at 117 7.

CAL. CIVIL CODE § I780. This is California's UDAP law.
Roberts, 394 F. Supp. 2d at 1178.

Id. at 179.
Id. at I 179-8o. The cases that the district court looked at specifically were: Rini v. United
Van Lines 104 F. 3 d 502 (ist Cir. 1997), Morris v. Covan Worldwide Moving, Inc., 144 F. 3 d 377
(5 th Cir. 1998), and Gordon v. United Van Lines, Inc., 23o F. 3 d 282 (7th Cir. 1997).
"'

's'
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removed from Carmack pre-emption.'53 This argument mirrored the
reasoning in Sokohos, 5 4 and the court did recognize that the
Defendant's "bait and switch" tactics were unrelated to a loss of goods
in shipment,'5 5 but ultimately the claims were pre-empted by the
comprehensiveness of the Carmack Amendment's occupying the entire
field of interstate carrier liability." 6
Somewhat ironically, the abuses occurring under the Carmack
Amendment are the not the first instance in which interstate carriers
have exhibited a pattern of misconduct when afforded special
protections by the law. In considering New York's 1 9 th century carrierfriendly approach"5 7 of generously limiting liability of shipping
companies, the Supreme Court noted in 1873:
'The fruits of this rule,' says Judge Davis, 'are already being
gathered in increasing accidents, through the decreasing care and
vigilance on the part of these corporations; and they will continue to be
reaped until a just sense of public policy shall lead to legislative
' 58
restriction upon the power to make this kind of contracts.'
Today, after nearly a century of frustration to the consumer
caused by the Carmack Amendment, a just sense of public policy again
demands that the issue of carrier liability be revisited.
V. THE COMMON LAW AS THE KEY TO A PROPER INTERPRETATION
OF THE CARMACK AMENDMENT
A. The Common Law Did Not Permit a Carrierto Limit Its Liability
When Its Contractswere Unfair or Were the Result of Deception
The Carmack Amendment was not enacted in a vacuum. At
the time of its enactment, there existed a body of common law which
dictated when liability could be contractually reduced."i 9 Prior to the
enactment of the Carmack Amendment, common carriers would
attempt to limit their liability through a private contract with their
clients. The common law that had developed around this practice is
summarily restated by Justice Field as:
The law prescribes the duties and responsibilities of the
common carrier. He exercises, in one sense, a public employment, and
has duties to the public to perform. Though he may... prescribe
Roberts, 394 F. Supp. 2d at 1182.
114 See Sokhos, supra note 118 and accompanying text.
155 Roberts, 394 F. Supp. 2d at 1182.
"56Id. at 1182-84.
157 See supra note IO5 and accompanying text.
1s3

's

N.Y. Cent R.R. Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. 357,368 (1873).

's

Adams Express, 226 U.S. at 509-10.
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regulations to protect himself against imposition and fraud, and fix a
rate of charges proportionate to the magnitude of the risks he may have
to encounter, he can make no discrimination between persons, or vary
his charges from their condition or character. He is bound to accept all
goods offered within the course of his employment, and is liable to an
action in case of refusal. He is chargeable for all losses except such as
may be occasioned by the act of God or the public enemy. He insures
against all accidents which result from human agency, although
occurring without any fault or neglect on his part; and he cannot by any
mere act of his own avoid the responsibility which the law thus
imposes. He cannot screen himself from liability by any general or
special notice, nor can he coerce the owner to yield assent to a
limitation of responsibility by making exorbitant charges when such
assent is refused. The owner of the goods may rely upon this
responsibility imposed by the common law, which can only be
restricted and qualified when he expressly stipulates for the restriction
and qualification. But when such stipulation is made, and it does not
cover losses from negligence or misconduct..."'
Further, a common carrier was not entitled to limit its liability
when it had engaged in deceptive conduct. 6 ' Nor would a carrier be
allowed to limit its liability if it were "unfair" to do so.'62 The only
situations in which carriers were exempt under the common law is
when the damage resulted from "acts of God," or "acts of the public
'
enemy."163
Thus, a fairly-well established body of common law had
developed prior to the enactment of the Carmack Amendment.
When Congress enacts statutes on matters which have
previously been governed by the common law, "Congress does not write
upon a clean slate."'6 4 As a general rule of law, common law rights
which existed prior to the enactment of a statute, or other legislation,
remain in effect unless expressly abrogated by the more recent
statute.'65 "[S]tatutes which invade the common law ...
are to be read
with a presumption favoring the retention of long-established and
familiar principles, except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is
evident, and in order to abrogate a common-law principle, the statute
must "speak directly" to the question addressed by the common law."' 66
Outside of the Adams Express decision, the Courts that have considered
16o
161

upheld).
162
16'

York Co. v. Cent. R.R., 70 U.S. 107, 112-13 (1865).
Hart, 1 12 U.S. at 340 (stating that contracts that are entered into free of deceit would be
See, e.g., Adams Express, 226 U.S. at 509.
N.J. Steam Navigation, 47 U.S. at 381 (1848).

The term "Acts of God" is generally

understood to mean acts of nature free from human influence. Blacks Law Dict. 33 (8th ed. 2004).
" U.S. v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993).
161 Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm't., Inc., 402 F. d 88i, 902 (9th Cir. 2005).
3
166 Texas, 507 U.S. at 534.

Disparity Out of Uniformity

2009]

the issue of Carmack pre-emption have neglected to consider the body
of common law of shipment contracts which existed at the time; nor
have they considered how this body of common law fits into questions
of Congressional intent and Carmack preemption.
In the case of the Carmack Amendment, the Court in Adams
Express recognized that under the common law, a shipping agreement
must be fair in order to allow any reduction in liability.'6 7 This practice
had long been established in the course of business as the preferred
method for common carriers to establish some sort of certainty as to
their potential liabilities should the goods be lost or damaged in
shipment.'68 It was this pre-existing common practice among shipping
companies that Congress sought to regulate and make uniform with the
169
Carmack Amendment.
In Adams Express, after considering the pre-emptive effect of
the Carmack Amendment, the Court addressed the argument advanced
by the Plaintiff that the Carmack Amendment should not pre-empt
state law claims because the Defendant's failure to inquire as to the
actual value of the diamond ring was "unfair."'7 ° The court ultimately
rejected this argument, although only upon a question of fact-on the
grounds that a failure to inquire as to the value did not render the
contract "unfair."'' Implicit in this reasoning however is the principle
72
that an unfair contract would not be entitled to Carmack preemption.
In deciding this issue, the Adams Express Court summarized
and actually reinforced the body of common law that had arisen and
upon which the Court relied on when considering the issue of
limitations on the liability of interstate carriers.7 3 The common law at
the time of the statute's enactment, as summarized by the Supreme
Court in Adams Express, required that a limitation of liability by an
interstate carrier depended upon a fair and reasonable agreement, free
of deceptive practices, to be valid. 4 Specifically, the Adams Express
Court stated in its summation of the common law that "It is just and
reasonable that such a contract [to limit liability], fairly entered into,
and where there is no deceit practiced on the shipper, should be
upheld."'75

Adams Express, 226 U.S. at 508.
168 N.Y., Philadelphia & Norfolk R.R. Co. v. Peninsula Produce Ex. of Md., 240 U.S. 34, 37
167

(1916).
169

Adams Express, 226 U.S. at 5o8.

170Id. at 5o8-o9
171Id.
17
173
174
175

Id.
Id. at 504-o6.
Id. at 509.
Adams Express, 226 U.S. at 511.
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B. Permitting State Consumer ProtectionClaims is Consistent With the
Common-Law and Should Not be Pre-empted by the Carmack
Amendment
State UDAP laws are consumer protection statutes patterned
after the FTC Act which prohibits "unfair or deceptive acts or
'
practices."176
Although Adams Express was decided well in advance of
the enactment of any statutes which employed the specific language of
"unfair and deceptive acts," the Court in Adams Express recognized
that in order to qualify for a limitation on liability the shipping contract
must not be unfair and it must not be deceptive.'77 The Carmack
Amendment contains no language which speaks to these common law
pre-requisites for limitations on liability, and any subsequent
abrogation of these requirements cannot be supported by recourse to
the statutory text.
In order to properly interpret the Carmack Amendment and its
scope of preemption, in harmony of the common law, the Courts cannot
ignore this requirement that contacts which are unfair, or which are
entered into by deception, cannot shield a shipper from full liability for
state law claims. Because claims under state UDAP laws by their very
nature concern allegations of unfair or deceptive conduct, the commonlaw rules would actually require that state consumer protection law
claims be allowed.
Thus, the proper interpretation of the Carmack Amendment, as
recognized by Adams Express, is that Carmack preemption should not
be extended in cases involving unfair or deceptive acts by carriers
consistent with the pre-existing body of common-law that had
developed prior to i9o6.
Because of the standard in the common law, which was not
addressed in the text of the Carmack Amendment, the proper course of
analysis for future Courts which must face questions of Carmack
preemption is to first consider whether or not the agreement was fair,
and whether or not deceptive acts or practices were used to induce the
consumer to agree to the shipping contract. Only if the Court finds that
the actions of an interstate carrier are free from unfairness or deception,
should the court move on to subsequent Carmack preemption
78
analysis. 1
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(I) (2006).
Adams Express, at 509.
"' Given the rule that the Carmack Amendment is intended to supplant state regulation of
carriers with federal regulations, this would likely need to be a federal standard measuring
unfairness, or deception. A number of such guidelines have been promulgated by the Federal
Trade Commission. However, this should not serve as a barrier to state law UDAP claims, so long
as they allege a violation of a Federal statute or regulation. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. 598.0923(3)
which automatically converts a violation of a federal law or regulation into a violation of state
176
177
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Actions under state UDAP laws, by their claims of unfairness
and deception should not be pre-empted by the Carmack Amendment
when properly construed because a successful claim under state UDAP
laws designates some action on the part of an interstate carrier to be
ipso facto either unfair or deceptive and therefore these should be
exempt under a proper construction of congress' intent in 19o6.
VI. CONCLUSION
The time has come to re-evaluate Carmack pre-emption
doctrine. Contemporary cases invariably look back to the Adams
Express decision for continued justification of Carmack's field preemption of state law without reconsidering the question of continued
field preemption in light of the common law.
The common law required that carriers' agreements must be
fair and free from deceit in order to qualify for a limitation on liability.
Nothing in the text of Carmack Amendment changes this requirement,
and interstate carriers should be held to the same standard today. As
consumer protection actions generally outlaw such unfair and deceptive
acts, carriers who have violated such UDAP provisions should not be
entitled to claim protection under the Carmack Amendment.
As the history surrounding the development of the Carmack
Amendment shows, Congress enacted the Carmack Amendment to
address a specific concern - the uncertainty of liability faced by
interstate carriers as imposed by state laws. However, in contemporary
times, these concerns are outdated, as significant developments in the
law allow interstate carriers ample opportunity to address these
concerns via the prior practice of entering to private agreements with
their customers. As the specific concerns underlying the Carmack
Amendment are no longer valid, the pre-emption afforded to the
Carmack Amendment should be re-evaluated and interpreted in a
manner consistent with these concerns.
The continued decisions of the federal courts to unquestioningly
apply the doctrine of field preemption to the Carmack Amendment
have created an environment which has shifted the burden of
uncertainty from interstate carriers to consumers as consumers may not
rely on any state consumer protection laws to protect them against
interstate moving companies. Asking consumers to bear this burden of
uncertainty is inconsistent with the common law, is a departure from
comparatively recent trends towards stronger consumer protection laws
on both the federal and state level, and is unnecessary after Erie and
UDAP laws. Such an interpretation would be consistent with the elemental holdings of Adams
Express and other early Carmack jurisprudence.
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Carnival Cruise Lines. Because contemporary applications of the
Carmack amendment's preemption powers against consumers serve
neither the purpose of the amendment or intent of congress, the time
has come to re-examine the validity of continued application of the field
pre-emption doctrine to the Carmack Amendment.

